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Abstract: In the present paper we analyse the emergence of the first federations in 
history, taking as an example the Achaean one. We analyse its structure decision 
making, institutions and finances. Then, we compare it to the present European Union 
and point out similarities and differences. Lastly, we attempt a valuation of the two 
federations according to two criteria: democratization and community of interest. Our 
conclusion is that the present European Union lags far behind the Achaean federation 
according to both criteria and has a long way to go in order to develop into a true 
federation. 
 
Introduction 
It is generally accepted that direct democracy emerged by the end of the 6
th
 century 
BC in classical Greece, the first fully developed example being Athens after 
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Cleisthenes reforms of 510-507 and the fall of tyranny
1
. This development was the 
result of a preceding macroculture, a long term framework of values, norms, customs, 
institutions and ideas that evolved in different fields of human activity, like war, 
religion, athletics, and the city-state, which in their combination were unique from 8
th
 
to 6
th
 century BC Greece.
2
       
 What is less known generally, but very important due to the early modern and 
contemporary developments is that within the same democratic macroculture the idea 
of voluntary federations of democratic city-states also emerged and practiced.  
Leagues and alliances were of course well known during the sixth and fifth centuries, 
and even much earlier, since the Mycenaean Kingdoms who fought the Trojan war 
(during the late 13
th
 or early 12
th
 century BC) were an ad-hoc alliance under a 
“supreme military commander” king Agamemnon of Mycenae.3    
 But the concept of federations of free democratic city-states that unite 
voluntarily to evolve into a specific political unit with an appropriate institutional 
structure was completely novel in its width and depth. Many modern authors continue 
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to call them “leagues”. But as it will become clear in the following analysis, this 
denomination is inappropriate, since the term “league” is almost a synonym of 
“alliance”. The political units which we will examine are certainly much more than a 
mere alliance, thus we will define them as proto-federations.   
 Federations, like the Boeotian one, and many more, are attested already with 
certainty during the 7
th
 century, but what was new with the emergence of the 4
th
 
century federations was their democratic basis, both at participating city-state and 
federal level, as well as their elaborate political and economic structure. For example, 
Rzepka among others analyses extensively the institutional functioning of one of the 
most advanced ancient Greek federations, the Aetolian one
4
 while Caspari analyses 
the system of monetary circulation of 18 Greek proto-federations of the so-called 
Hellenistic era (4
th
 to 2
nd
 century BC).
5
      
 In the present essay we analyse first, as a case study, the Achaean federation. 
Then, we compare it to the European Union and make some suggestions as to what 
lessons for today’s development of the EU can be drawn from the functioning of the 
Greek proto-federations. 
 
The Achaean federation 
The Achaean federation was established in 280 BC, but an older alliance of city-states 
of the North-Western Peloponnese (a part of today’s southern Greece) comprising 12 
members, is attested already during the 5
th
 century and may have served as a model 
                                                          
4
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for the Achaean federation.
6
 The main reason for its establishment, as was the case 
also for the other major contemporary federations, was defense mainly against the 
militarily mighty northern Greek kingdom of Macedonia.     
 The federation increased from 10 members in 280 BC, to as many as 50 
members later. It developed from a previous regional federation, by the voluntary 
adhesion of city-states all over the Northern and Central Peloponnese including such 
important ones, as Sikyon (251 BC), Corinth (243 BC), Megalopolis (capital of the 
ex-Arcadian federation, 235 BC) and Argos (229 BC).
7
 The Achaean federation was a 
major political force in Greece, trying to balance Macedonian and Spartan power in a 
series of wars and shifting alliances, being successful in safeguarding its city-states 
independence against both powers. It was abolished after resisting Roman 
encroachment during the 2
nd
 century BC, being decisively beaten by the Romans at 
the battle of Leukopetra in 146 BC, which resulted to the destruction of Corinth, one 
of its most prominent cities.        
 This is not only spelled the end of the federation, but the end of Greek 
                                                          
6
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independence and the abolishment of democratic regimes. Achaean region then, 
formed during the first century BC a roman province.
8
  
2.1 Political organisation  
The main contemporary source concerning the Achaean federation is Polybius, 
but the information he provides has led modern historians sometimes to different 
interpretations. The main institutional bodies of the Achaean federation were the 
Assembly, to which all citizens of all constituting city-states aged 30 and above could 
participate (Pol. Hist. 29. 23-35; 29. 24.6; Larsen, 1972). Apparently, the Assembly 
was called for specific purposes within the years, to decide on specific important 
issues.           
 Possibly, the Assembly was called once a year during April-May, which may 
be an indication that strategic matters for the year were discussed and decided upon, 
since spring (April) was usually the beginning of the campaigning season during 
ancient times. A second political body was the Synodos or Boule (meaning the 
Council), which may have been a preparatory body which set-up the agenda for the 
Assembly's meeting, having perhaps as a model the Athenian Boule.
9
 It appears 
though, that for the period 217-200 BC, the Assembly decided on issues of great 
importance like war and alliances, and delegated day to day affairs of the federation to 
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the Boule. The members of the boule were elected representatives of the city-states.
10
 
If this interpretation is correct, then we have for the first time in history, a mixed 
democratic system combining elements of both direct democracy, the Assembly, with 
elements of representative democracy, the Boule.      
 The reason for the development of this dual system must have been that as the 
federation increased in size, distances became longer, thus making the participation of 
simple citizens costly and time consuming. The distance for example from the city of 
Patra to the capital of  the federation Aegion, is about 100 km, and from the city of 
Megalopolis to Aigion more or less the same, necessitating if one takes account of the 
roads of the period, at least three days and likely four or five on foot to travel to 
Aigion.
11
 It seems also, that the federation did not provide its citizens with 
remuneration for participating in the Assembly as was the case in classical Athens. It 
is not known if this was a conscious political decision, or was due to an economic 
impossibility to provide funds for this participation, but the result was that in the 
Assembly more prosperous citizens tended to be overrepresented.
12
    
 On the other hand, since members of the Boule were voted locally in their 
city-states, they were the more representative of all citizens. At the beginning, the 
Assembly met at Aigion, but later on, General Philopoemen established a system 
under which the Assembly met periodically also in other member city-states like 
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Argos. The other institutional bodies of the federation were elected by the Assembly. 
First, among them was the Strategos, (the General), who was combining the offices of 
both the supreme military commander of the military forces and of political head of 
the federation, reminding somewhat the de facto position of George Washington 
during 1776-1783, or Napoleon during 1798-1814.     
 Under the General, a governing body of a 10 member Council, called the 
synarchontes, undertook the day to day administration. Further, three military 
commanders, the ipostrategos (major-general) the hipparchos, head of the cavalry, 
and navarchos (admiral) served under the general. Ancient sources attest also the 
existence of a grammateus (“secretary”) who may have been responsible for the 
“paperwork” of the federation, like the Assembly's and the Boule's decrees and laws.13
 A very important element of the federation, was the isopoliteia of its citizens, 
meaning that a citizen of one member city-state, had political rights as a citizen, if he 
moved into another member city-state, a situation that clearly surpasses today’s 
European Union. A Portuguese moving for example to Germany, does not get 
automatically voting rights at German federal elections, as would be the case say, for 
a citizen of ancient Patras moving to Megalopopolis, who were both members of the 
Achaean federation. Another innovative institutional element was the establishment of 
some kind of a Federal Court of Justice.       
 Usually, such court(s) were empowered to solve political differences arising 
among member city-states, taking over a role of intermediation. Usually, a third 
member city-state was chosen for this task, as for example Megara in a dispute 
between Corinth and Epidaurus, or Patras between Thourioi and Megalopolis. 
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Sometimes, a body of more than one city undertook this task, as for example 11 cities 
intermediating in litigation between Epidaurus and Arsinoe.
14
 The Federal Court(s) 
were also responsible for some criminal and property rights cases (possibly involving 
citizens of different member city-states.
15
     
 Polybius goes as far as to write
16
 “During times, these cities came to such 
perfection and welfare, that they were connected not only in friendship and alliances, 
but they had the same laws, the same measures and currency and common archons 
(government officials), members of the Boule and judges. In general, only this point 
showed that almost the whole of the Peloponnese was not a unique city: Its 
inhabitants were not circumvallated by the same wall, everything else was common 
and the same for everyone together and for each city-state apart” (our own translation 
from the original text).  
 
2.2  Military Organisation 
The federation disposed of a federal army under the Strategos, organized according to 
that period armies. It comprised heavy infantry in phalanx formations, light infantry 
and cavalry. The federal army consisted of formations provided by the city-states and 
augmented by mercenaries if and when needed. In 217 BC for example, the federal 
forces comprised of 3000 infantry, 300 cavalry, 8000 mercenary infantry and 500 
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mercenary cavalry.
17
 An individual as commander of the naval forces of the 
federation is also attested. Many of the constituting city-states of the federation, such 
as Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus had a long-standing and strong naval tradition. 
 
2.3 Economic organization 
We have less information about the economic organization of the federation than 
about its political, so that in order to answer even tentatively some crucial questions, 
we will advance a few conjectures. The federation was a monetary union like today’s 
European Monetary Union (EMU), with the difference that it was a multicurrency 
area: There was a parallel circulation of federal coins and city-state coins, as attested 
by archaeological findings.
18
       
 This raises a number of questions: What was the analogy of federal to city-
state coins? To this, no answer can be given. Who was responsible for the minting of 
coins? We assume that there were city-state and federal mints, working in the city-
states and the capital. We further assume that the federal coins were linked to 
payments of the federal budget, as for the federal army and navy, federal 
administration, federal buildings in Aegion etc. An analogy to the EMU is that federal 
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coins had on the one side a head of Zeus or Artemis and the inscription ΑΧΑΙΩΝ 
(meaning, “of the Achaeans”) and on the other side, the name of the issuing city-state 
like AXAIΩΝ-ΑΙΓΕΙΡΑΤΩΝ (“Achaeans of Aigira”) like euro coins which bear on 
the one side the symbol of the issuing member-state. This again could mean that 
federal coins were minted also at city-state mints, on behalf of the federation. 
 A further question refers to the exchange rates: We assume that since all coins 
had silver content, the exchange was made according to the silver value of each coin. 
Then, again we presume the existence of banks that would have undertaken this task, 
in the main member city-states and the capital, Aegion. It is now accepted
19
 that 
already during the fourth century Athens had a very developed banking system, and 
that the Greek world was monetized. Thus, we believe that the fourth century 
Athenian experience would have been diffused to the rest of the Greek world, 
especially in areas and city-states like Corinth, which were also important 
international trading centers. On this issue it has been estimated that thirty-five 
hellenistic cities included private banks during the 2
nd 
century BC.
20
 
 Lastly, and very importantly, is the issue of the federal budget, on which we 
know nothing, but whose existence is made clear by the existence of federal coins. 
Such coins indicate the existence of a federal budget, else for what purpose should 
they have been issued? We assume as stated above, that the federal budget covered 
federal army, federal administration and buildings expenses, and perhaps a few 
extraordinary expenses, like public federal festivals. Since the rise of the army and 
navy were variable, the size of budget must have varied too.    
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 We will attempt at least an estimate of the military expenditure based on 
known army size for some years, to give at least an order of magnitude for the budget, 
bearing in mind that military expenditure was the major federal budget item: 
According to ancient sources
21
 the daily wage of soldiers during the 3
rd
 century must 
have been 1.5 drachmae, and for cavalryman (including fodder) perhaps 5.
22
 
 The 217 BC federal army comprised in total 11.000 infantry and 800 cavalry, 
thus a total of 20.500 drachmae per day, or 615.000 per month, or about 100 talents, 
(one talent equals 6000 drachmae). Assuming an eight month campaign period per 
year excluding winter, the total military cost for this year would have been 800 
talents, a very substantial sum for the period. Even if we assume that all the other 
federal items came to about 100 talents, we arrive at a total federal budget estimate of 
900 talents, which is a very substantial sum, comparable to the Athenian budget with a 
revenue of 1200 talents in the 330’s during the time that Lycurgus was tamias (eg. 
finance minister).
23
         
 This sum must have represented also a substantial percentage of the, unknown 
size, federation’s total GDP, but certainly much more than the 0.95% of the current 
EU’s GDP represented by the EU budget. We know nothing also about the revenue 
                                                          
21
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22
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Paper presented at the 16
th
 Annual International Conference on Economics and Security, Cairo, June, 
2012; David Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
23
 Nicholas Kyriazis, “Financing the Athenian state: Public Choice in the Age of Demosthenes”, 
European Journal of Law and Economics 27, (2009): 109-127. 
12 
 
side of the federal budget, but based on a related analysis
24
 we will advance some 
hypothesis taking as a benchmark the Athenian 4
th
 century budget. Revenue sources 
must have been: a) city-state contributions: The existence of federal coins minted in 
the city-states mints is such an indication: Possibly, the city-states gave their 
contributions by minting in their own mints coins which they then forwarded to the 
federal budget. b) custom duties levied on exports, imports, as was the case in ancient 
Athens, in the port of Piraeus, where the rate was 2% on value. We do not know if 
this is the case in fact, but it is a possibility, especially if we assume the existence of 
an internal market, as we will discuss next. c) Military plunder: We assume, that 
military plunder during successful expeditions against enemies would accrue to the 
federal budget.          
 It seems that the possibility of plundering during war campaigns must have 
been very common during ancient times. Roger De Laix
25
, based on Polybius (4.5.1) 
argues that the troops of a neighbor state to the Achaean federation, the Aetolian one, 
were accustomed to plundering. d) Liturgies.
26
 Again, we know nothing about it, but 
it might be possible, that some kind of trierarchy existed for the fleet’s warships, 
                                                          
24
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inspired by the Athenian example. A last issue we raise here, is if and to what extent, 
the federation was not only a monetary union, but also an economic one. Again, we 
have limited evidence, but the indication we possess, permit us to advance tentative 
answers: The existence of monetary union and the circulation of parallel currencies 
are evidence of free mobility of capital within the federation. The existence of 
isopoliteia for citizens is very strong evidence for the free circulation of labour. If a 
citizen of one member city-state has free political rights in another, then presumably 
he can settle and work there. Thus two of the main pillars of today’s EU, free 
circulation of capital and labour existed already in the Achaean federation.  
 The harmonization of measures and standards as attested in the passage of 
Polybius above, is an indication for the existence of free circulation of goods, and the 
existence of an internal market. These measures make sense only in order to 
implement such an internal market, else why they introduced them? Thus, it seems 
that all three basic freedoms of modern federations were already present in the 
Achaean one. In the above section we have raised more questions than we could 
provide specific answers, due to a lack of evidence. Still, since these particular 
questions have been raised by us know, we hope that they will be a useful 
contribution for the start of research on these topics.  
 
The European Union: A comparison with the Achaean federation 
Since the institutional setting of the EU is well known, we will not present it 
here in detail, but only its main institutional characteristics in table 1. Taking as a 
basis of our discussion the characteristics illustrated in Table 1, which provides a  
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Table 1: A comparative analysis of the institutional framework of the Aetolian federation in relation to 
the EU.  
Federatio
n 
Member 
states
1
 
Capital Political structure 
Common 
citizenship 
Monetary 
union 
Commo
n 
Foreign 
Policy 
 
Federal 
Armed 
Forces 
Federal 
budget 
 
 
Democratic 
Structure 
Achaean > 40 Aigion 
 
Local (city) Assemblies 
+ Federal Assembly (Synkletos) 
 
Federal Council (Boule) 
 
Strategos (General-military 
commander and head of federation) 
 
Supreme Council of the 10 
(synarchontes) 
 
Deputy General 
hipparch commander of cavalry 
Nauarchos (Admiral) , 
Public Secretary 
 
Federal Courts 
 
isopoliteia, 
yes 
Yes, federal 
and city-
states 
currencies 
in parallel 
circulation 
Yes, 
army 
and navy 
 
 
Yes, strong 
own means, 
probably 
custom 
duties and 
cities 
contribution
s 
Strong 
direct 
democracy 
at local and 
federal level 
 
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
 
 
27 
member-
states 
 
 
 
 
Brussels 
 
European Parliament 
 
European Commission 
 
European Court of Justice 
 
European Councils of Ministers +  
Council of the EU 
 
President 
 
Ministers of external Affairs 
 
 
 
no 
 
 
Yes, for 
EMU and 
the 
European 
Central 
Bank 
No 
federal 
army 
and 
navy- 
weak 
CFSP 
 
 
Very weak 
(0,95% of 
GDP in 
2013) 
 
Own means, 
mainly 
custom 
duties and 
small 
percentage 
of vat 
Weak, no 
direct 
democracy, 
only elected 
Parliament 
with limited 
powers, 
non-elected 
other bodies 
Interactive analysis based on the findings of related studies.
27
 
                                                          
27
 See André Aymard,                                                                                
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Confederacy”, J.A.O Larsen,  “A recent interpretation of the Achaean assemblies” and F. W. Walbank, 
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comparative analysis of the institutional framework of the Achaean federation in 
relation to the EU, we arrive at the following conclusions: First, the two cases show 
similarities in their political structure and administration. The main difference, a 
crucial one, concerns their democratic structure: In this, the Achaean which practiced 
direct democracy at both the local and the federal level, comes out as the most 
democratic.           
 The EU is a representative democracy at member-state level (with elements of 
direct democracy at city and country level in some member states like Germany
28
 and 
a weak representative democracy at the federal (Union) level, with only one elected 
body, the European Parliament, which has only limited competences. Second, all 
three were monetary unions with a common currency (for Europe, the 17-member 
EMU) with the difference, that the Achaean federation had also a parallel circulation 
of city-states currency. Third, both cases practiced the so called “three fundamental 
economic freedoms”, free circulation of goods, labour and capital. This was 
augmented in the Achaean case with the fundamental “political freedom” of 
isopoliteia, eg., citizen and voting rights in other member city-states.  
 Fourth, both cases had a federal budget, to finance the military forces. Both 
had some “own” federal means (mainly custom duties) as federal revenues. None can 
be regarded as a “fiscal union”, in the sense of having a harmonized tax system, tax 
basis and tax rates. We know nothing on this for the Achaean, we know that for the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“Aratos of Sicyon” and Nicholas Moussis, Access to European Union: Law, Economics (Rixensart: 
European Study Service, 2008) for the EU. 
28
 See Dieter Nohlen & and Philip Stöver, Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook (Berlin: Nomos 
Publishers, 2010). 
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EU, these is a common tax base for vat, but different tax rates for incomes, property 
and capital profit. There are serious doubts if the EU is an “optimal fiscal area” so that 
harmonization could proceed in the future.
29
  During recent years, dissatisfaction of 
citizens and euroscepticism is growing fast in many EU member-states (Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Greece, France, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Spain), mainly 
due to the austerity measures introduced by their governments. What we believe is 
crucial here, is the perception by citizens in these countries (and we emphasize the 
world perception) that these measures have been imposed by the EU, and its strong 
member, Germany against their own and possibly, their elected government’s 
wishes.
30
          
 All successful federations are based on three fundamental principles, 
                                                          
29
 George Halkos & Nicholas Kyriazis, “Is Tax Competition Harmful and is the EU an Optimal Tax 
Area? European Journal of Law and Economics 21, (2006): 163-177. 
30
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twentieth, which resulted in the Opium Wars, the Taiping and Boxer revolts, civil war, the fall of 
empire of Chinese, a Japanese invasion and chaos. The utter contempt with which the EU and 
Chancellor Merkel has treated property rights, as for example the PSI also of individual Greek 
bondholders and the expropriation of deposit holders of some Cypriot banks, is truly amazing and 
without precedent. This, certainly does not generate feelings of solidarity and trust. The prevailing 
feelings of insecurity and uncertainly among almost all the EU citizens concerning that safety of their 
bank savings does not promote growth. Econometric studies have established how important trust is for 
growth. See Jacob Dearmon & Kevin Grier, “Trust and Development”, Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization 71 (2009): 210–220; Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, “Trust and Growth”, The 
Economic Journal 111, (2001): 295-321. 
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solidarity, trust and community of interest, both in the relations between their 
member-states, and the attitude of citizens towards, the federation. Where the three 
principals were strong, the respective federation had great cohesion. When they are 
weak or begin to waken, as in today’s EU, cohesion starts to suffer and the federation 
may be in danger. This argument is also verified by the findings of Musgrave
31
  who 
argued through the theory of economic federalism that states willingly decide to 
participate in a federation type multinational political entity in order to increase their 
level of national security, to establish a custom union or to achieve a series of other 
specific goals. The relation between economic development and federal political 
structures is also verified by the findings of other authors too.
32
    
 In previous studies
33
 we have analysed for classical Greece, how these 
principles-values evolved in the military field due to the introduction of the phalanx 
formation, the heavy infantryman-hoplite, and the fleets. These values such as trust, 
                                                          
31
 R.A. Musgrave, “Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political Federalism” in National Bureau of 
Economic Research (ed.), Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization (New York and Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 97-122; R.A. Musgrave, “Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political 
Federalism” in Wallace E. Oates (ed.), The economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance 
(Chelterham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998), 187. 
32
 M.V. Pauly, “Income Reduction as a Local Public Good”, Journal of Public Economics, 2 no. 1 
(1973), 35-58; M.V. Pauly, “Income Reduction as a Local Public Good”, in Wallace E. Oates (ed.), 
The Economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance (Chelterham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 1988), 364-388. 
33
 Nicholas Kyriazis & Xenophon Paparrigopoulos, “The Birth of democracy: Values in War and 
Politics in Classical Greece”, in Peter. Hermann (ed.), Democracy in the Theory and Action (New York: 
Nova Publishers, 2011), 277-287; Nicholas Kyriazis, & Xenophon Paparrigopoulos, “War and 
Democracy in Ancient Greece”, European Journal of Law and Economics, 2012, DOI 
10.1007/s10657-012-9352-1; Kyriazis, N. & Economou, “Macroculture, sports and democracy”,  
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cohesion, bravery, courage, discipline), virtue, self-sacrifice, self-consciousness, 
altruism, harmony, friendship, politeness, justice, self-denial, fair competition, 
equality, egalitarianism, self-awareness, temperance, isonomia (political equality), 
cohesion and a sense of community of interests, isegoria (right to speak and express 
freely one’s personal ideas, otherwise, democracy), homonoia (concord), freedom etc 
were transformed into political and democratic values. Ancient and modern sources of 
literature such as those we present here so far, convey that this tradition continued 
also with the Achaean case. Federations which their main reason of establishment was 
mainly defense against a great external threat, such as the Achaean and Aetolian cases 
in ancient Greece, the medieval Swiss against the Austrians and Burgundians, the 
United Provinces against Spain, and the USA against Great Britain, developed 
solidarity trust, cohesion and a sense of community of interest.   
 These values and principles are the “glue”34 that hold them together, so long as 
the threat persists, defense is successful and the economy thrives. If this persists long 
enough, the political and institutional structure is embodied in the society, so that it 
continues even after the initial reason, the external threat ceases to exist, as in the 
cases of the Swiss federation and the USA. This endurance is founded still on 
common defense, a strong federal budget that undertakes the finance of policies at the 
federal level, and strong political and democratic institutions at the same level, that 
legitimize the federation in the eyes of their citizens.    
 If you vote for example for the federation’s president (even if indirectly) as in 
the USA and if you serve and perhaps fight in the armed forces of the federation, then 
                                                          
34
 We call this a “glue”, inspired by the Athenian 4th century orator Demades, who called theorika (eg. 
money paid out of the Athenian budget to citizens, in order to enable them to participate in the 
Assembly) the “glue of democracy”. See Plutarch Moralia. 1007B). 
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you have a sense of being a citizen of the federation, of belonging to the USA or 
Switzerland, and not, just say, to the State of Arizona or the canton of Unterwalden, a 
sense of promoting the supreme political idea of homonoia.
35
 All the above seem to 
be lacking in today’s EU and we advance these preliminary ideas as a possible 
explanation, to be analysed more in future works. The EU lacks a strong federal 
budget, common defense and armed forces, and democratic legitimization in its 
organs, as indicated above. For example, the subsidiarity principle as Hayek defined 
it
36
, which delegates many competence to the national level, although understandable 
in today’s political situation, certainly does not increase cohesion. In view of the 
above, can we learn something for the Achaean federation thus, may be useful in 
reducing the EU’s democratic deficit and increase solidarity, trust, community of 
interests and cohesion among its citizens?       
 We think, that a possible future achievement of such principles as those 
mentioned here by the EU, would strongly counterbalance the arguments and the fears 
of a portion of European citizens that still are afraid of a possible creation of an 
absolutist or monolithic type of pan-European “Super-state”.  
Conclusions 
 By the functioning and analysis of the Achaean federation and with its the 
comparison with the EU, a series of ideas arise, which they could be regarded as a 
                                                          
35
 Homonoia is usually being translated as “concord”, but P. Cartledge in a personal communication 
suggested to us that a better translation could be “same-mindness” and unanimity, which is stronger 
than concord. 
36
 See Friedrich August Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of 
Ideas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), chapter 14. 
 
20 
 
benchmark for current EU integration issues: Firstly, a more democratic and direct 
democratic procedures must be introduced at the political level, for example, the 
President and the “Foreign Minister” of the EU, known also as the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy must be elected 
by universal vote and not be appointed. The only elected EU body, the European 
Parliament, should have increased its competences. Secondly, legally binding popular 
initiatives at EU level should be introduced (and not as per Lisbon Treaty, only of a 
consultive character) as practiced in other federations like the Swiss, or some states of 
federations (such as for example, in California in the USA and in Bavaria in 
Germany).          
 Thirdly, the size of resources of the EU budget intended for the recovery of 
the European economies because of the eurocrisis, which are approximately 0.95% of 
the total EU Gross National Income (GNI), should be increased. A “0.95% solidarity” 
is just not sufficient, if the EU really wants to develop into a true federal union. 
Economic measures should be discussed, and we believe, as increasingly more 
economists suggest, be changed. Austerity measures were necessary in many 
member-states in the recent past. But solidarity in austerity is certainly not a 
permanent solution because citizens of member-states suffering under it, and the 
recession it induces will not be accepted forever, thus threatening the future cohesion 
of the EMU and the EU.        
 We are aware that this analysis and our suggestions open up a vast future area 
of research and discussion, which we hope that our paper helps to promote. 
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